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McCleary: Interlocutory Orders Are Not Appealable in Government Civil Antit

CASE NOTES
FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS ACT-THE EXPEDITING ACT-INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ARE NOT
APPEALABLE IN GOVERNMENT CIVIL ANTITRUST LITIGATION.

Oil Co. v. United States,--- U.S.
(1972).

-,

Tidewater

93 S. Ct. 408, 34 L. Ed. 2d 375

The United States initiated action against Phillips Petroleum Company and
Tidewater Oil Company for civil antitrust violations of the Clayton Act.' In
April, 1971 Tidewater asked to be dismissed as a party to the litigation. Alleging that its presence in the suit was inappropriate, Tidewater declared
that the Clayton Act was directed only against the acquiring corporation, Phillips, and not against it as the seller. The motion was denied and Tidewater
requested that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consider the soundness of the lower court's interlocutory order. Relying upon Section 2 of
the Expediting Act, which provides that in all civil antitrust suits where the
Government is the complainant "an appeal from the final judgment of the
district court will lie only to the Supreme Court," 2 the court of appeals rejected
consideration of the interlocutory order for want of appropriate jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Marshall: Held-Affirmed. Section 1292(b)
of the Interlocutory Appeals Act has no effect upon the Expediting Act's denial of court of appeals jurisdiction over interlocutory orders. In government
civil antitrust cases, appeals can be reviewed only from final judgments and
3
only by the Supreme Court.
In 1903 there was a significant need to regulate the country's ever increasing concentration of economic power. 4 The problem was further magnified
as antitrust suits arising under the Sherman Act5 were subjected to lengthy
appellate procedural delays. 6 -Important litigation was forestalled almost in1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). The Act provided that
[n]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire .

.

. the whole or any part

. the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where ...
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition ....
of .

.

2. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970) (emphasis added).
3. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 408, 34 L. Ed. 2d
375 (1972).
4. 113 CONG. REC. 18817 (1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). The Act states "[elvery contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . ...
6. It has been the requirement that appeals from the district court may be reviewed by the court of appeals if within a 6-month period. Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
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definitely.7 Therefore, the giant monopolistic corporations were enjoying an
8
era of economic conservatism as well as a beneficial judicial process.
As a corrective measure, the Expediting Act was imposed to speed the determination of prominent antitrust cases 9 and to furnish uniformity' 0 in future antitrust regulations and forms of competition." The solution provided
that review of final federal district court decisions was directly appealable
to the Supreme Court' 2 within 60 days.' 3 In addition section 1 of the Act declared that in any government civil antitrust action arising under the Sherman
Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, "or any other Acts having a like purpose,"
the Attorney General may certify that the case is of "general public importance" and assign such action to a three-judge district court for immediate
review.14

Such an approach was not a significant deviation from federal appellate
procedure. The Expediting Act simply added another group of cases to the
existing six classes where the Supreme Court had direct review over the decisions of the district courts. 1 Even though the courts of appeals had been
created 12 years earlier,' 6 Congress continued to exhibit reluctance in grant7
ing them jurisdictional authority.'

Initially, review of interlocutory orders was accorded the courts of appeals only in litigation where they already possessed review of final decrees. 18 Through a complicated array of Congressional amendments,' 9 Sec517, § 11, 26 Stat. 829. In addition, an unsuccessful litigant was granted a 1-year
period within which to make an appeal from the court of appeals to the Supreme
Court. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 828.
7. 113 CONG. REc. 18819 (1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
8. 9 Hous. L. REV. 1099 (1972).
9. Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 375 U.S. 39, 40, 84 S. Ct. 8, 9, 11 L. Ed. 2d 8, 9 (1963) (per
curiam), modified, 375 U.S. 994, 84 S. Ct. 627, 11 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1964) (mem.); see
36 CONG. REC. 1679 (1903) (remarks of Senator Fairbanks).
10. Comment, Direct Appeals in Antitrust Cases, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1558 (1968).
11. The Expediting Act reflected the Roosevelt administration's efforts to formulate antitrust policies within the purview of national interests. Comment, Direct Appeals in Antitrust Cases, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1558, 1559 (1968).
12. The Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
13. 113 CONG. REc. 18819 (1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
14. The Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1970).
15. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827, 827-28. The already existing six classes were: (1) prize causes, (2) capital or infamous crimes, (3) construction of the Constitution, (4) jurisdictional questions, (5) constitutionality of a law
of the United States or the validity or consruction of a treaty, and (6) constitutionality of a state law or constitution.
16. Id. § 2.
17. Comment, Proposed Amendment to Expediting Act Would Eliminate Direct
Appeal to Supreme Court, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 319 (1964).
18. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat. 828.
19. In the Act of April 14, 1906, ch. 1627, § 7, 34 Stat. 116, the Evarts Act of
1891 was amended so that appeals from interlocutory injunctive orders could be taken
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tion 1292(a)(1) of the Interlocutory Appeals Act was finally developed
and provides that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction over appeals
from interlocutory injunctive orders of the federal district courts "except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court .... -20 Ten
years later, through the enactment of section 1292(b), additional court of appeals jurisdiction was allowed in the review of noninjunctive interlocutory

orders when the district judge
shall be of the opinion that such an order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is no substantial ground for differences of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation .... 21
On its face, the statutory language of section 1292(a)(1) and (b) fails
to exclude intermediate appellate jurisdiction over interolocutory orders in

government antitrust cases.22 However, to determine the actual meaning of
legislation, it is essential to investigate the judicial interpretaion of such rules
of law.
Although decided 30 years prior to the Interlocutory Appeals Act,23 the
landmark case in this area of federal appellate procedure is United States v.

California Cooperative Canneries.24 In that decision, the Supreme Court
reviewed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's reversal
of an interlocutory order denying a petition to intervene in a suit arising under
antitrust laws. 25 It was ruled that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the district court's interlocutory order as Congress,
through the Expediting Act, precluded the possibility of any interlocutory ap26
peal in government civil antitrust cases.
Since passage of the Interlocutory Appeals Act in 1948, not only has the

directly to the courts of appeals "in any cause" regardless of whether or not the
court of appeals could review the final order.
The Act of March 4, 1911, ch. 231, § 129, 36 Stat. 1134 further clarified the appellate procedure by declaring that the courts of appeals were to review interlocutory
injunctive orders of the district courts.
By the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 238(1), 43 Stat. 936, a new dimension
was formulated in federal appellate procedure. This section established that "[a]
direct review by the Supreme Court of an interlocutory or final judgment or decree of a
district court may be had where it is so provided in the following Acts . . . (1)
Section 2 of the [Expediting] Act of February 11, 1903 .... ." Id. at 938.
20. Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970).
21. Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
22. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, -

U.S.

,

,

93 S. Ct. 408, 412, 34

L. Ed. 2d 375, 382 (1972).
23. 9 Hous. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1972).
24. 279 U.S. 553, 49 S.Ct. 423, 73 L. Ed. 838 (1929).
25. California Coop. Canneries v. United States, 299 F. 908 (1924), rev'd, 279
U.S. 553, 49 S.Ct. 423, 73 L. Ed. 838 (1929).
26. United States v. California Coop. Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558, 49 S. Ct.
423, 425, 73 L. Ed. 838, 842 (1929); Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370, 40 S. Ct.
347, 349, 64 L. Ed. 616, 619 (1920).
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value of the Expediting Act been seriously questioned 27 but conflicts have
developed among the courts of appeals in determining appropriate antitrust
28
appellate procedure.
In the controversial decision 29 of United States v. Ingersoll-Rand,30 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that it was the intent of Congress
in passing section 1292(a)(1) to relieve the harsh effect of California Cooperative Canneries and allow intermediate appellate review of injunctive
interlocutory orders. 3 1 A similar conclusion was reached in Fisons Ltd. v.
United States3 2 as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that section 1292(b) was in complete accord with the purpose of the Expediting Act.
The court ruled that section 1292(b) established appellate review of noninjunctive interlocutory orders which may materially advance the ultimate
3
termination of the litigation .
Diametrically opposing these positions, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in United States v. Cities Service Co.3 4 held that there had been no
clear legislative intention to modify the Expediting Act.88 Therefore, to
allow review of interlocutory orders pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) would
be to erode the lawmaking powers granted to Congress. 36 In almost identical fashion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
FMC Corp.,3 7 ruled that the Expediting Act precluded the court from granting
jurisdiction over interlocutory injunctive orders.38
The Supreme Court, in formulating its opinion in the instant case, hoped to
remedy the discrepancies among the various appellate courts. To achieve
this objective, the Court recognized two basic issues: First, whether a court
of appeals in government civil antitrust litigation had jurisdiction over injunctive interlocutory orders pursuant to section 1292(a)(1); and second,
whether section 1292(b) provided intermediate appellate jurisdiction over
noninjunctive interlocutory orders.
27.
(1968).
28.
Ed. 2d
29.

See, e.g., Comment, Direct Appeals in Antitrust Cases, 81

HARV.

L. REV. 1558

Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -, -,
93 S. Ct. 408, 410, 34 L.
375, 380 (1972).
It has been said that the court of appeals' ruling in Ingersoll-Rand was a vain

farcical attempt to provide piece-meat judicial repeal of a well settled law. 77 HARv. L.
REV. 566, 570 (1964).

30. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
31. Id. at 517.
32. 458 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972).
33. Id. at 1245.

34. 410 F.2d 662 (lst Cir. 1969).
35. Id. at 664.
36. Id. at 670.
37.

321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963).

38. Id. at 535; accord, Farbenfabriken Bayer v. United States, 72 CCH TRASE
CASES

570, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 959 (1968).
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Cognizant of the plausibility of conflicting constructions on the face of section 1292(a) (1), the Court held that there has been no congressional intention to establish jurisdiction of injunctive interlocutory orders in the courts
of appeals 39 except where a final decree may be taken. 40 By reiterating almost 70 years of judicial precedent, 41 the Court reasoned that
whatever ambiguity may exist in the lengthy history of the original
interlocutory appeals provision relative to the Expediting Act, it results
primarily from the absence of any consideration of government civil
antitrust cases in that history and thus emphasizes the extent to which
appellate jurisdiction in such cases has long been viewed as a peculiarly
distinct matter .... 42
The Supreme Court had not previously considered the specific effect of section 1292(b) upon the Expediting Act. In resolving the issue, special
emphasis was placed upon legislative history which indicated that section
1292(b) applied only to noninjunctive interlocutory' orders "not otherwise
appealable under section 1292(a)" in civil cases where the courts of appeals would have jurisdiction were the judgment final. 4 3 It is consistently
held that "repeals by implication are not favored" 44 and that the language of
a specific statute, such as the Expediting Act, controls over the language of
45
a more general statute, such as the Interlocutory Appeals Act.
From this point it became easy for the majority to hold that the courts of
appeals could not be allowed jurisdiction over interlocutory orders pursuant
to section 1292(b) when such jurisdiction was not granted by section
1292(a). 46 The appeal of right provided injunctive orders in non-Expediting Act cases is clearly superior to the restrictive appeals of noninjunctive
orders.

47

39. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 408, 415, 34 L. Ed.
2d 375, 385 (1972).
40. Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970).
41. See generally Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S.
137, 142, 64 S.Ct. 905, 908, 88 L. Ed. 1188, 1192 (1944).
42. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 93 S. Ct. 408, 416, 34
L. Ed. 2d 375, 386 (1972). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
306, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1513, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510, 524 (1962). Although the specific litigation involved a direct review to the Supreme Court, in dictum it was stated that all
interlocutory orders are denied appellate review.
43. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 93 S. Ct. 408, 417, 34
L. Ed. 2d 375, 388 (1972).
44. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437, 88 S.Ct. 2186,
2202, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1189, 1206 (1968).
45. Clifford F. Mac Evoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107, 64 S.Ct. 890,
894, 88 L. Ed. 1163, 1167 (1944); D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208,
52 S.Ct. 322, 323, 76 L. Ed. 704, 708 (1932). It was petitioner's contention that if
a conflict in the law exists then the subsequent statute takes precedence over the prior
statute. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 127 F.2d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 1942).
46. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -- ,
93 S. Ct. 408, 418,
34 L. Ed. 2d 375, 389 (1972).
47. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 418, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 388-89,
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The Court finally stated that an anomalous situation would develop from
intermediate appellate review of certain interlocutory orders while the Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment.48 The effect of such a procedure would make the courts of appeals
an advisory board to the district courts on issues with which they would have
no authority to rule with finality.49 The judgment of the court of appeals on
the interlocutory order could be reconsidered by the Supreme Court on
appeal from the final decision of the district court. The result would be of
questionable assistance to the district court and mean additional work for
the court of appeals.5 0 An interesting situation would develop if an extraordinary writ 5 ' were granted which would require the Supreme Court to review the interlocutory order and also the district court's final judgment. If
the writ were denied, then the district court might be permitted "to
proceed to final judgment on an erroneous basis."' 52 Federal courts should
be spared such a "potential waste of limited judicial resources . . .,,3
In criticizing the majority's reasoning, the dissent declared that section
54
1292(b), in permitting certain interlocutory appeals in "all civil actions, 1
was in complete harmony with the Expediting Act which applies to only final judgments. 5 Justices Stewart and Rehnquist argued that section 1292(b)
reflected Congress' "contemporary view that interlocutory appeals . . . on

controlling questions of law provide a desirable tool that should not be denied even in Expediting Act cases." 5 6 The dissent's arguments fail to withstand scrutiny; it seems completely unrelatistic to assume that Congress in
1958 granted appellate review of certain noninjunctive interlocutory orders
while retaining the jurisdictional denial of the frequently more significant
injunctive orders.
Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent's statutory interpretation of section 1292(b). However, in a separate opinion, he disagreed with both the
majority and minority opinions that the Expediting Act overburdened the
court.5 7 Justice Douglas concluded that the consideration of important anti48. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 421, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 391.
49. Id. at -, 93 S.Ct. at 421, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 392.
50. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 421, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 392.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
52. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. , , 93 S. Ct. 408, 420,
34 L.Ed. 2d 375, 391 (1972).
53. Id.
54. Id. at -, 93 S.Ct. at 423, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 395 (court's emphasis).
55. Id. at -, 93 S.Ct. at 423, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 395.
56. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 426, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 398.
57. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 421, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 392. In dictum, the majority
opinion stated that the valuable input of court of appeals review is barred by outdated federal appellate procedure. Uniformity in antitrust laws can be effectively
maintained by review in the courts of appeals and the right of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 419, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 390. The minority reasoned
"that interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b) in government antitrust cases would serve
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trust litigation affecting the nation's economy imposed no added load on a
"vastly underworked" court.""
The Supreme Court's remedy in the instant case appears to have been only
temporary. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its recent decision,
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States,5 9 reviewed a district court interlocutory order to produce certain allegedly privileged documents in antitrust litigation intitiated by the Government. The court granted
jurisdiction by concluding that Tidewater bars appellate review of interlocutory orders which are part of the main antitrust action but allows appeals
from such orders that place "a litigant on the horns of a dilemma."6 In
granting the Expediting Act a practical rather than a technical application,
the court explained that the Supreme Court would not preclude appellate
review of an interlocutory order when there was a danger of denying justice. 61 It seems that the court of appeals has attempted a superficial distinc62
tion in the face of explicit Supreme Court language to the contrary.
Apparently, irreconcilable contradictions of the interpretation of the Expediting Act are likely to continue until remedial legislation is enacted.
Even the few proponents of the Expediting Act feel that some improvements
are in order. 6 3 Criticism of the present appellate procedure was appropriately summarized by Mr. Justice Clark:
Whatever may have been the wisdom of the Expediting Act in providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of its enactment in
1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory. .

.

. Direct appeals not only

place a great burden on the Court 64
but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of Appeals.
Since 1949, various attempts have been made to modify, amend or repeal provisions of the Expediting Act 65 but Congress has failed to reach a compromise. Of the numerous previously proposed amendments only the one
presented on behalf of the American Bar Association in 1967 seems to efto lighten the burden on trial courts and litigants alike." Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 428,
34 L. Ed. 2d at 399-400.
58. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 423, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 394.
59. - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1972).
60. Id. at -.
61. Id. at -.
62. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 93 S. Ct. 408, 421,
34 L. Ed. 2d 375, 391-92 (1972); United States v. California Coop. Canneries, 279
U.S. 553, 558, 49 S. Ct. 423, 425, 73 L. Ed. 2d 838, 842 (1929).
63. Kirkpatrick, Antitrust to the Supreme Court: The Expediting Act, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 746, 786 (1969); Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative
View, 1961 N.Y.S.B.A. ANTITRUST LAW SyMPOSiuM 94, 97.
64. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1, 83 S. Ct. 1773, 1774
n.1, 10 L. Ed. 2d 823, 827 n.1 (1963).

See, e.g., Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-

Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases, 1961 N.Y.S.B.A. ANTITRUST LAW
SYMPOsIUM 98, 99.
65. Comment, The Antitrust Expediting Act-A Critical Reappraisal, 63 MICH. L.
REv. 1240, 1250 (1965).
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fectively reduce the heavy caseload of the Supreme Court, expedite significant litigation affecting the nation's economy, and maintain uniformity in
antitrust regulations. The proposal basically stated that the appellate courts
would have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and interlocutory
orders of the district courts in civil antitrust suits where the Government is
complainant. Direct Supreme Court review would exist when the final
judgment or interlocutory order stemmed from a three-judge district court
decision or when the Attorney General or the district court certified that the
final judgment or interlocutory order was appropriate "in the interests of justice." 66
Elimination of Section 1 of the Expediting Act in the American Bar Association's proposal could prevent an unfair Government advantage. It seems
unreasonable to furnish the Attorney General with the authority to empanel a
three-judge district court to hear antitrust litigation from which an appeal of
right is granted and also to provide him with authority to certify that a
single-judge district court decision warrants immediate Supreme Court review.
Section 1 of the Expediting Act has proven to be of dubious value since
conception, as it has "raised grave questions of fairness. ' 67 Furthermore,
the rarely employed three-judge district court, 68 as an integral part of this
type of review, has been regarded with disfavor among the judiciary.6 9
In fact, during one 20-year period, only a single antitrust case was tried be70
fore such a tribunal.
The other proposed amendments appear to grant an even greater advantage to the Government, 71 seem virtually ineffective, 72 or provide an unnec66. S. 2806, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

But cf. Comment, Proposed Amend-

ment to Expediting Act Would Eliminate Direct Appeal to Supreme Court, 39

N.Y.U.L. REV. 319, 326 (1946). The ABA proposal was analogous to an earlier proposal in 1963 by Senator Eastland for the Department of Justice; the only difference
being that S. 2806 provided 70 days within which the Attorney General or the district court could certify the case for direct Supreme Court review and the Justice Department proposal provided a 30-day period. S. 1892, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
The 1963 version of the ABA proposal was markedly different from the 1967 bill as
it advocated complete repeal of § 1 of the Expediting Act. S. 1811, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963).
67. Celler, Case in Support of Application of the Expediting Act to Antitrust
Suits, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 29, 49 (1964).
68. Compare 9 Hous. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1972) with Gesell, A Much Needed
Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases, 1961 N.Y.S.B.A. ANTITRUST
LAW SYMPOSIUM 98, 99.
69. Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y.S.B.A.
ANTTrrUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 94.
70. See United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal.
1963).
71. Senator Tydings proposed a bill reflecting the view that § 1 of the Expediting
Act should be retained and suggested that § 2 be repealed by allowing courts of appeals
jurisdiction over all district court final judgments and interlocutory orders. S. 2809,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (emphasis added).
72. The Harvard Legal Research Bureau proposed that appeals from final judg-
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